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8 June 60

Honorable Barry Goldwater
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Goldwater:

I read in the Congressional Record the statements which you delivered on the floor of the Senate on 26 May and again on 1 June regarding the U-2 incident and the summit collapse.

Your kind remarks regarding this Agency's work have been greatly appreciated by all of us.

Sincerely,

/s/
Allen W. Dulles
Director

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public expenditure should be met. But the cost is higher than our present level of public spending. I frankly believe that education and health for our children, dignity and beauty in our civic lives, and security and well-being in the world at large are more important than the "things" which might otherwise have priority.

But still more important is America's need to face squarely the facts about its situation. If freedom is really the organizing principle of our society, then we cannot forget that it is not illusion, propaganda and sedatives, but truth, and truth alone, that makes us free.

Under the influence of the politics of sedation and the techniques of salesmanship, I believe that in recent years self-deceit has slackened our grip on reality. We have tended to shirk the difficult truth and accept the easy half-truth. Perhaps it is always that way. As the old humorist Josh Billings used to say:

"As scarce as truth is, the supply has always been in excess of the demand."

ENTAILS HARD CHOICES

But we know from our own lives that reality entails hard choices and disappointments: that it measures real achievement not in terms of luck but in terms of difficulties overcome. I don't believe our national life can follow any other pattern.

No preordained destiny decrees that America shall have all the breaks and soft options. Neither greatness nor even freedom lies that way. So we must surely return to the reality principle, to the bracing, invigorating, upland climate of truth itself. I think we are ready now to move forward into the rigors and glories of the new decade with open eyes, eager step and firm purpose worthy of our great past.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR OF THIS ARTICLE

Adlai Ewing Stevenson, Democrat, was twice a candidate for the Presidency, opposing Dwight D. Eisenhower, Republican. Mr. Stevenson was born in Los Angeles in 1900. He received his bachelor's degree from Princeton in 1922 and his law degree from Northwestern University in 1924.

After practicing law in Chicago, he was assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1941 to 1944, assistant to the Secretary of State in 1945, and U.S. delegate to the United Nations General Assembly in 1945 and 1947. He served as Governor of Illinois from 1949 to 1953.

Mr. Stevenson is now practicing law in Chicago. He is trustee or director of various educational and philanthropic organizations. He is the author of "Call to Greatness," published in 1954, and "What I Think," 1956.

CONSCIENCE DEMANDS MEDICAL CARE FOR OUR SENIOR CITIZENS

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, I am sure that we do not think of ourselves as a Nation without a heart, or a Congress without a conscience. Still, in the minds of millions of older Americans, such as the woman who wrote a letter, which I now submit, this is what we have become. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that her letter be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIER: I am writing to see if something can be done for the older citizens who must rely on social security and old-age pensions for a living. I am very grateful to a good President, Franklin Roosevelt, who had heart enough to think of old people. However, since that became law, the cost of living has gone up so high

high that the older folks do not get even the necessary things to make their lives comfortable. They do not have the medical care they need because hospital and doctors' fees are so high, not to mention drugs.

I think it is wrong for a country like ours to forget their old people who have helped make America the great country that it is and I think they should have the comforts of life before we send money for other country's people.

ARMENIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, this coming Saturday marks the independence day of Armenia. This is an anniversary of great patriotic significance to Armenian people throughout the world, but it unfortunately cannot be celebrated in the Armenian homeland as it will be observed by Armenian-Americans and Armenian peoples elsewhere in the world. The Armenian Republic was established and recognized by the United States in 1920. But it maintained itself as a sovereign nation for only a few months, before the armed might of Soviet Russia overwhelmed the nation and overthrew the independent Armenian Government. In the same year of 1920, the Soviet Union proclaimed the Soviet Republic of Armenia, and the homeland of the Armenians remains within the Soviet Union today. In February of 1921, Armenian patriots fought a valiant and temporarily successful rebellion against the Soviets, but in a matter of months, reinforced Russian troops again took over the nation.

In our own country, the Americans who comprise the Armenian community have a deep understanding and appreciation of the heritage of freedom and democracy which perhaps too many Americans sometimes take for granted. They or their descendants have fled their homeland to escape brutal invaders or tyrannous dictators. Their contribution to our American political and social tradition and to our general culture has been great. Their opposition to communism has been monumental and soundly rooted. Armenian-Americans are anxious now to see the reestablishment of an independent, democratic Armenia. It is appropriate that Americans therefore join with their fellow citizens of Armenian descent in recognizing the significance of this independence date, and in supporting their hopes for the reestablishment of a free, democratic Armenia.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PROXMIER in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

SOURCES OF NATIONAL PRIDE

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the effort at the summit has come and gone. It failed, as many thought it would.

as some hoped it would not. But as we look back on the past several years, the events surrounding it, I believe that the American people can be proud of two things that emerged.

First, we have a great source of pride in our President. In the face of a bullying and scurrilous attack by the leader of the forces who will, as long as they exist, make any summit an impossibility, President Eisenhower maintained a calm dignity and a restraint which no weaker man could not have achieved. He proved again that there are in his heart a passion and a desire for peace that we have not seen equaled in our lifetime. It was this simple badge of honesty and decency that accentuated the cleverness of Khrushchev's attack, and made clear to the world that the real obstacle to peace is the Soviet Communists—not the Soviet people, but their leaders.

Our second source of pride is the achievement of the CIA in the instance of the U-2. Frankly, my confidence in this Agency was never too high; but this achievement has caused my opinion toward it to soar tremendously. Those whose typewriters have been punching through a dark ribbon of gloom relative to our lack of intelligence of our enemy must now be amazed at what actually has been going on in this field as I feel most Americans must be. Our amazement is coupled with pride as we rather the secure feeling that we have been obtaining knowledge of the enemy at a rate and of a quality that surpasses our greatest hopes. To the CIA and to the Lockheed Aircraft Co., to the men who flew the U-2, and to their ground crews must go the undying gratitude and respect of the American people. I detect more, by far, of a feeling such as this, than the feeling expressed by others—others who would apologize to the bully; who suggest it was the fault of the United States that the summit failed; who continue to be afraid of the Soviet and would yield West Berlin to the tyrants. Thank God that those timid souls are in the complete minority in our land, and that the majority of Americans feel more secure in the knowledge gained by this program; knowledge that makes less out of much that the Communists and their sympathizers in our land would have us believe; knowledge, for example, that the Soviet cannot, as they have boasted, shoot down any aircraft flying over their heartland, regardless of speed or altitude; knowledge that our current force of more than 2,000 bombers, including 1,400 B-47's and 550 F-52's, could fly against their obviously limited air defenses with success; knowledge that, by the same token, our carrier-based aircraft could carry out attacks 1,000 miles into the Soviet Union; knowledge that some 1,000 fighter bombers located around the periphery of the Soviet borders could drop atomic or TNT bombs from 500 to 1,000 miles within that country. This is intelligence developed from the flights of the U-2 and from other sources, and it is something we should be proud of, and not ashamed of.

I am disturbed that some of our colleagues have thought it wise to instigate

an investigation. To me what the CIA has done was something that had to be done, and it is as integral a part of national defense as the weapon in the hands of a soldier. One of the first tenets of war is to know what your enemy has and what he might do with it. This is what the CIA and the military were trying to do, and what they should always be trying to do. To me this is the duty of the intelligence gathering agencies, and not the business of some committee of Congress. To be sure, it would be a closed-door investigation, but all of us here know that there are hundreds of ways for what goes on behind closed doors to become the property of the press, the radio, the TV, our people, and, I might add, the Soviets. I am hopeful that those who, in the heat of development, called for this inquiry will, in the interest of the country, see that it does not proceed. Gathering intelligence of what the other fellow is doing is practiced by business, by labor organizations; yes, even by some husbands and some wives. It is not new. It is not novel. It must go on at the national level, and we, as a branch of our Government, should not make more difficult a task which is always a hard one.

The President's suggestion, made again last evening on TV, that the United States institute a system of worldwide surveillance so that every country could know what every other country is up to militarily, coincides with a similar one I made on this floor last week. I urge that it be done with any equipment we have, and I hope we will utilize not only surveillance missiles but the B-70, with its 80,000-foot-plus, 2,100-mile-an-hour capability.

Today the errors committed are far outweighed by the successes achieved. Instead of carping at our mistakes, we should forget them and devote our efforts to stimulating a national pride in the two successes we have—our President's actions in face of the enemy and our tremendously expanded knowledge of the enemy's abilities achieved through the U-2.

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER DELIVERS CHALLENGING ADDRESS ON AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, at a meeting of the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia on April 22 Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller, of New York, delivered the first of a series of four addresses on major issues confronting the people of the United States. The title of this address was "The Third Century," its reference being to the fact that the third century of our history as a nation is opening before us.

Governor Rockefeller reviewed the historical background in which we enter this new century, and he stressed the tremendous area of challenge that lies before us on this threshold of a new era. In view of the stirring nature of this address, of its significance in terms of our spiritual growth as a nation, and in terms of our position of leadership responsibility in the world of freedom, I ask unanimous consent that the address

tion-and-answer period be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the address and questions and answers were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE THIRD CENTURY—A CONCEPT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

(By Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller, of New York)

In this city so profoundly linked in fact and in memory with the birth of America, I appeal to history to remind us plainly, as a people, where we stand, for what we stand, where we may fall, where we dare not fall, but must prevail.

I shall state the matter of the moment as gravely as I see it.

It rises from the very history and heritage and character of the American people.

As a people, we have cherished and respected basic spiritual and religious beliefs and values proclaiming the supreme worth of the individual.

Our beliefs about individual man have been rooted in the profound and priceless truths of Judaism and Christianity.

These truths define man as the supreme creature of God. They therefore proclaim the individual the supremely valuable being on earth, and the free fulfillment of his destiny the supreme purpose of life itself.

No state can decree this fulfillment; God alone could do that. No state can define this destiny; man alone can do that.

Brother to all men and the servant of none, the free individual is gifted with a life whose laws and standards and purposes stand above, not beneath, the state.

And the true role of the state, therefore, is to respect and to serve the matchless dignity of the individual.

Our forefathers in the middle of the 18th century realized that their hopes and aspirations for the fulfillment of man could not be achieved in the political world in which they found themselves.

Hence they moved to the historic achievement of creating in the form of the American Nation a political structure within which this deep belief in the worth of the individual, and these spiritual values could flourish and find fulfillment.

This action was destined to inspire the dynamic political forces of democracy throughout the world.

These values and beliefs were themselves not national but universal. And as the heritage of the people themselves, these principles have forever inspired us to reach out beyond the framework of our own Nation.

Accordingly, through the ensuing decades, we as a people have given testimony by our deeds to the values we cherish and to our concern for humanity at large.

We have done this in many and changing ways: in things religious, through missionaries to distant lands; in things social, through charities and foundations; in things economic, through aid and comfort to the needy and afflicted; in things military, through lives given in defense of freedom.

This has been the history and this has been the nature of our life as a people.

Two centuries after the creative work of our Founding Fathers, the formidable fact is now emerging that these principles of individual freedom and individual worth can live and achieve universal application only if we join with other peoples to create larger political structures binding many nations in common purpose.

If we fail to do this in this mid-20th century, we will risk not merely national peril in a conventional sense; we will risk the death of those values that inspire the struggle for human dignity and freedom throughout the world.

The task, then, is truly momentous. It is nothing less than this: to match the

new institutions, new associations of nations, that can give all the world the same tangible hope for the realization of freedom to our forefathers gave to a single nation.

In the 18th century, we succeeded as a people because we had a clear sense of purpose and dedication. In the 20th century we have not yet succeeded as a people because we have lacked that single sense of purpose and dedication—and instead we have improvised.

In the 18th century, we, the American people, had an idea of man that inspired and governed our action and conduct as a people. In the 20th century, we have too rarely, too casually, related our actions to that idea—with the result that our national conduct has been inspired less by our own beliefs than by the threats of others.

In the 18th century, we knew that our idea of man to be realized had to be translated into concrete and specific political forms and institutions. In the 20th century, we have tried largely to substitute military acts or economic acts for the vital and lacking political acts of creation.

The full gravity of our position in the world today can be summarized in simple questions.

If it has become possible for Communists to twist and distort our very ideas of democracy and freedom and justice—and to exploit these words as if they were their own—is this not plain proof that somehow we ourselves have failed to give these ideas vital and convincing expression?

If the Communists seem forever ingenious and inventive in promoting chaos, is not their apparent skill at least partly, perhaps largely, a reflection of our failure to promote order?

If the Communists have success in waging political and psychological war, is not their success greatly due to our failure to create larger political structures in which freedom can flourish?

If communism has an appeal to newly emerging peoples as a way of life bordering on a religion, is it not because we have failed to give content to our concepts of brotherly love and human dignity in our preoccupation with material success?

The conclusion seems to me as clear as it is crucial.

We cannot successfully serve the cause of freedom in the 20th century with revised 18th-century boldness, with dedication less fervent, with purpose less clear than in the 18th century.

What is needed to serve the dignity and freedom of the individual in this century can hardly be less than what was needed in the 18th.

In the revolutionary times through which we pass, we shall be the creators of circumstance—or we shall be its victims. And the issue will turn not upon how well we can counter the thrusts and intentions of others—but how well we can embrace and convey our own conviction.

To carry such conviction on the world scene demands of us the same two creative achievements of which the American people proved themselves capable two centuries ago.

We must bind our acts as a people firmly to our idea of man, the free individual.

And, working with other peoples and nations, we must translate this idea into political forms and institutions, so that the idea becomes not only right but also relevant for the lives of free peoples everywhere.

We face in the world a kind of political wilderness in which the hopes for freedom of all peoples may be lost.

The scene is more challenging and perilous than the wilderness the American people confronted two centuries ago.

We can do no less than match them and their vision.

We must be pioneers once again—political pioneers—pioneers of peace.

...the ... project is now in ...

...to me it is our duty, Mr. ... to put an end to the super- ... boondoggling national civil ...

...the character of warfare has ... since the end ... We are ... in the jet-missile space are ...

...Civil defense is ... now conducted in this country is as ... as the clock mustache ... the clock mustache and the cannon ... the Civil War period ...

...the end of World ... civil defense in this country has ... the taxpayers of the United States ... a million ... to lay our civil ... defense program is a myth. This ... billion-dollar waste of taxpayers' money ... should be stopped.

Mr. President, the only sensible course of action is to abolish the entire present setup. In its place we should depend upon leaders of our Armed Forces to defend our civilians in any war waged against us. Further, Mr. President, we should initiate a vigorous and continuing campaign of first-aid education on self-protection in the event of any attack upon this Nation, using all media of communication, at our command, television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and our schools.

Hundreds of thousands of patriotic Americans have volunteered their time and efforts, often at great risk to themselves, in times of need. In other words, they have volunteered to be ...

...ready save taxpayers money by forcibly ...

The Administrator of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, ex-Governor Hoegh, of Iowa, served one term of a \$12,000-a-year salary. We do not need to feel sorry because he was defeated at the end of his first term, when the people of his State evidently were not satisfied with his administration. Following his defeat, the President immediately appointed him Administrator of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization at a salary of \$22,500. He is now serving as the head of an utterly ... with many ...

...and Defense Mobilization for ... This of liberation always ... Here is one place where we can really save the taxpayers' money, without doing any harm whatever to the public and without doing any harm whatever to the safety and welfare of our country. Now is the time to put an end to this waste of money for all in- ... utterly worthless, outmoded boondoggling.

All of us know that in a time of grave national emergency, the Armed Forces of our country will defend the citizens of the United States as they always have. Surely the defense of our citizens is too important to be left to any one other than the trained and experienced men of the Armed Services—the men of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force of this Nation.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO THE SUMMIT MEETING

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the other day I expressed some misgivings about the inquiry by the Committee on Foreign Relations into the summit meeting. Of course, I had no aspersions on the competence of that committee. But I felt, and feel, that most of the hidden facts of the U-2 episode are of a military or an intelligence character, and therefore ought to remain hidden. More important, I felt—and feel—that great mischief will be done by any investigation which proceeds under the assumption that there was an American "failure" at Paris, and that those "responsible" must be brought to book. Now that the inquiry has begun, I think all of us are obliged to ...

...out of the controversy ... American Government bears ... of the blame for the collapse of the Paris talks. This contention ... in turn, on the theory that two ... acts—the President's assumption of responsibility for the U-2 flight ... by him and Mr. ... displaying that the flights would continue left Khrushchev no choice but to break up the summit. This theory, in its essentials, has been adopted by several authorities; by Khrushchev himself, of course; by Governor Stevenson; and by a number of lesser American personages. The copyright, however—at least in virtue of first usage—belongs to Mr. Walter Lippmann, who spelled it out in his column 5 days before the summit blew up. By that token, if Mr. Lippmann is not the architect of a policy, prophet and continuing counselor, it is not my habit to take public issue with newspaper columnists; but this is not an ordinary occasion, and Mr. Lippmann is not an ordinary columnist. In addition to being ...

...and ... with ... for ... undoubted ... including ... I do not say ... of ... that ...

...the United States ... President ... the President ... they would ... policy ... the key ...

...to know that we inter ... It makes it ... the ...

Mr. ... has rene ...

...Paris talks ... to reach violently in order to preserve its self-respect ... true that we ... the responsibility for the collapse of the Paris talks.

Note ... fully ... his ... Moscow ...

We . . . resolved (after the Soviet disclosure of the U-2 flights; to do nothing that would prevent the United States President from getting out of this embarrassing predicament. We even declared that the United States President hardly knew or approved of such actions and (evidently the hotbeds from the Pentagon and Allen Dulles, this professional spy, they are to blame. But Eisenhower did not take advantage of the opportunity granted him. He declared that the spy flights had been approved by him and made with his knowledge. . . . That is when it became obvious that the purpose of the aggressive actions by the United States was to torpedo the summit meeting.

The first fact on which the Lippmann theory runs aground is that it was not the United States, but the Soviet Union that made an international incident out of the U-2 episode. The subsequent breakdown of the Paris talks will never be understood unless this initial event is kept clearly in mind, that Khrushchev deliberately chose, in a flamboyant speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5, to publicize the American spy flights, and the fact that one of our planes had been shot down. Now let us be sure that we understand the magnitude of this decision to draw public attention to the flights, that we appreciate the great risks Khrushchev was running, and therefore the much stakes for which he was playing.

On May 6, the Kremlin decided to abandon this policy. When one of our planes was shot down, "I am convinced it was definitely not shot down from cruise missile," said Karshinsky, claimed Karshinsky those to blow up the matter into a full-scale international incident.

The second fact that makes trouble for Lippmann's theory is that Khrushchev refused to go ahead with the summit—even after President Eisenhower announced the U-2 flights would be discontinued and would not be resumed. Before the Paris meeting Lippmann had written that his only criticism was that the President had made spying our "avowed" policy. The further recommendation—that the President should have apologized—did not find its way into the Lippmann doctrine until after Khrushchev had demanded an apology in Paris. It was the avowal that had made it "impossible" for Khrushchev to play down the incident. Well, the President disavowed the policy: I cannot imagine a plainer disavowal than a promise to discontinue a past policy. And still Khrushchev blew up the summit. My personal judgment is that it was unwise to have disavowed the policy once it had been avowed. The point, however, is that once it was disavowed there was no further excuse under the Lippmann theory (or Khrushchev's) for not holding the summit talks.

And I emphasize that this is a purely hypothetical statement.

Does anyone seriously think, in the light of what had already happened and of what was to follow, that Khrushchev would have let the matter drop at that? Having persuaded the President to say that much, how, he would surely have tried to force him to eat the words he said. It is not difficult to imagine Khrushchev rejoinder to such a statement by Eisenhower, however, if he had made such a statement - which he did not; and this is a hypothetical rejoinder that I ascribe to Khrushchev:

(22) [unclear]

Would not Khrushchev have replied in this vein had Eisenhower followed Lippmann's advice? The logic of the situation demanded it. Having deliberately created the incident, Khrushchev was bound to subject it to the last dose of ridicule and scorn. Thank goodness our President and his advisers had the good sense to stand where they did instead of allowing the situation to deteriorate further.

1 I repeat: Once it was clear that
2 Khrushchev was determined to do it,
3 the plane incident as far as it could,
4 and once it was clear that he was in
5 possession of physical proof that the spy
6 flight took place, nothing could have been
7 more foolhardy than for the President
8 to have tried to deny it, or to have pre-
9 tended he did not know what was going
10 on, or to have apologized for it.

This brings us to a point which has disturbed many people--many who reject the appeasement aspect of the Lippmann thesis. Would it not have been better, if it were for the United States simply to have remained silent during Khrushchev's denials? Could we not, by this course, have avoided compromise? He City of London, and also have avoided the danger of a new war. The United States Government, however, has chosen to make a public statement. Mr. Lippmann writes knowingly of the "double life" nations lead--the hidden life of spy operations and the open life of normal diplomacy--and he accuses the U.S. Government of plunging off the veil from the hidden life. He was it really the United States which tore off the veil?

Look at it this way. Can we ever re-member a previous instance in modern history in which the chief of state of a major power has gone before a coun-try's parliament to make a public ex-posure of another great power's activi-ties and that country's chief of state has responded to the public in the same way? Can we ever find a case in which the chief of state of a major power has done this?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am not attempting to be self-righteous. I have a good deal of experience in the military to believe that a nation cannot carry on day-to-day peaceful military operations without a full knowledge of the enemy. It is not possible. There is no country in the world that the Russians have good information of our military capabilities as we have, if not better. My action was merely an every-day thing, one of which the activities of the military are the main business.

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As one who knows a little about aerodynamics, I say that if anybody had told me the U-2 airplane was doing what we now know it accomplished, I would have said, "I doubt it. I do not think it is possible." Now we know it is possible.

I am addressing my remarks today to those who wish to make out of this incident either a political issue—and I am sure the Senator is not one of those—or an issue that can bring weakness to the American people instead of the pride that should be in their hearts. I speak not necessarily of the pride of spying, because all of us dislike the word. But the fact that we have been able to keep up with the military capabilities of the Soviet and keep ahead of them militarily is a great source of reassurance to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. So far as I am concerned, I regret we do not have more information with respect to what is going on behind the Iron Curtain. I wish we had more. But I feel that when the decision was made in advance that if and when one of the U-2 planes came down over enemy territory it would not be admitted to be a spy mission, having made that decision it would have been better to have stayed with it.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Once Khrushchev had decided on this extraordinary course, the United States had no choice but to react in kind. Once Khrushchev decided to make spy operations a factor in international diplomacy, the United States had to assume that his real purpose in creating the incident was diplomatic in nature. To let the decision to publicize the U-2 mission and the summit meeting were, in other words, interrelated.

Mr. KHRUSHCHEV. I am sure that the United States will not be able to keep the U-2 planes from flying over Soviet territory. I am sure that the United States will not be able to keep the U-2 planes from flying over Soviet territory. I am sure that the United States will not be able to keep the U-2 planes from flying over Soviet territory.

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But Khrushchev's alternate objective—that of diverting attention from the fact his bluff was called—is today close to realization. For far from celebrating our victory, we are cringing before the criticism and are haunted by the doubts of those spiritless creatures in our midst who ask, plaintively, whether we should have dared to win. Instead of taking to heart the lesson of the past few weeks, and proclaiming it to the world, we are—ourselves—trembling before it. We cannot quite accept, even now, the moral of the recent ordeal—that firmness pays off.

Is it not time to say that the summit has come and gone, and that there is no shooting, nor any danger of it, and that Berlin remains free? I do not mean to suggest that victory will always come so easily for the West—that we can always avoid shooting. But when the happy event occurs, and we are vouchsafed such a triumph, let us, for heaven's sake, recognize what has happened. Let us not fall under the spell of our American Hamlets. Let us not collapse of shock for having made a firm decision.

I have steadily opposed summit meetings on the grounds that the only way they can produce is progress toward Communist domination of the world. Either summit meetings must be held, having achieved nothing, or they must be held, having achieved something. I am sure that the United States will not be able to keep the U-2 planes from flying over Soviet territory.

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Sometimes from unexpected quarters we are handed a benefit. Hence we often say that "it is an ill wind that blows no good." Nikita Khrushchev may be surprised to learn the true consequences of his reckless action in Paris recently, as he disclosed the summit conference and publicly insulted the President of the United States.

We are, indeed, indebted to the Soviet Premier for the following consequences: 1. The credulous, naive attitude adopted by various groups among us in their advocacy of summit conferences were revealed as hopelessly impractical. No longer will we listen to the argument that these conferences will override the historic ways of the United Nations and have the power to settle the disputes which threaten the world with nuclear war.

2. The appeasers, who have thought that the way to get peace is by making concessions after concession to the enemy, now have been proved illogical, misguided, and without persuasive influence.

3. The leaders of thought who have urged that America maintain its strong defenses and place its reliance on the maintenance of deterrent strength have been vindicated and will now have an increasing influence with American public opinion.

4. The tactics of the Soviet Government, as it has sought to divide the Western allies, weaken NATO, and cause a crumbling of morale in the West, have been successfully thwarted. The Western alliance today has a resounding strength—its cause is the rightness of its cause and in its military power to deter war.

5. The world has at last learned many unpublished facts in the Soviet Union. The opportunity to this might have been furnished by the Soviet Union, but it has not been taken. I am sure that the United States will not be able to keep the U-2 planes from flying over Soviet territory.

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the Western governments to arouse world opinion on this contingency even though everyone knows the West would not strike the first blow. The world now has had brought forcibly to its attention the vital necessity of preventing or intercepting "surprise attack." The House of Representatives, through one of its appropriation committees, has given formal sanction to such a policy.

10. The outcry of the Soviet Government about "aggression" and "spying" must inevitably cause the world to ask when the Soviets will withdraw their agents from Cuba and other Latin-American countries, as well as from Europe, Asia and Africa, and really cease their "aggression."

11. Last but not least, the Soviet chief, Khrushchev, has asserted a right to tell the American people the kind of administration he wants to see elected in this country in November. Let's grant him that privilege on the condition that free elections be held in the Soviet Union and that our radio messages no longer be jammed as we exercise a similar right to tell the Soviet people whom they shall choose as their ruler.

Yes, we can say, "Thanks, Mr. Khrushchev" for having opened not only our eyes but the eyes of free peoples everywhere to the simple fact that there can be no safety for any country as long as an arbitrary, autocratic regime, with the power to make sudden war, rules in Moscow.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield.

Mr. KEATING. Unfortunately I was absent from the Senate during the early part of the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. Goldwater) and heard only a part of what he said. Certainly, as he pointed out, the only way to deal with the men in the Kremlin is by a policy of firmness and strength. In this regard, I find myself in complete accord with the views expressed by the Senator from Arizona. I am sure we can deal with the men in the Kremlin in the same way that we have dealt with the men in the Kremlin in the past.

President Eisenhower recognized the fact. I share the view expressed by the Senator from Arizona that President Eisenhower's success as he Republican or Democrat must also recognize this fact; and I am quite certain that he will. Wee beides us if he does not.

Certainly the issue of who best can deal with this problem and who best can deal with the men in the Kremlin—Khrushchev or his successor—is bound to be uppermost in the minds of the American people as they approach the forthcoming election.

The Senator from Arizona has made a great contribution to our thinking on this subject by his address. He said, "Sometimes, and only sometimes, we must be sure that the other side is not in a position to make a surprise attack."

same subject. While he and I are occasionally—but only rarely, I might say—in disagreement, there is no issue on which we are more in agreement than the matter of the defense of the United States.

My remarks today were addressed not only to the necessity of American leaders recognizing this fact, which I believe they do—and I agree with the Senator from New York when he says that regardless of who the next President may be, he will lead from strength—I am concerned in these remarks today about the efforts being made by some people in this country—not purposely—to mislead the American people into thinking that we can deal with these tyrants. We would call them hoodlums in this country, by being nice to them, in the belief that they will treat us as they would want us to treat them. At the recent summit meeting—even though I do not agree with the idea of summit meetings—the heads of the American Government and all the agencies concerned with that incident displayed admirable courage, and their performance made me a little prouder of being an American.

SECRETARY SEATON APPROVES PADRE ISLAND SEASHORE AREA

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, although Interior Secretary Fred Seaton and the administration have urged the Congress to pass an omnibus bill providing for establishment of three national seashore parks, I am advised by Secretary Seaton that he has no objection to the establishment of a national seashore at Padre Island National Seashore.

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to go ahead with Padre Island legislation before adjournment.

This is based upon the fact that on this island of over 100 miles of wild, undeveloped land, without a single structure on it for more than a hundred miles, it would be cheaper to buy the land now than later, when it has been developed.

Recently the distinguished and able senior Senator from Montana (Mr. Murray), chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, called for a departmental report on the bill S. 4, which provides for establishing Padre Island National Seashore.

Secretary Seaton reported that his department has no objection to enactment of H.R. 4, provided that it is amended to conform with that portion of the Interior Department's omnibus proposal pertaining to Padre Island. As I previously informed the Senate and the Interior Committee I am glad to so amend S. 4 and will shortly submit the amended bill and request its early consideration by the committee and the Congress.

In his report, Secretary Seaton points out that—

The estimated cost of acquiring the land for Padre Island National Park is \$4 million.

The Secretary estimates that the expenditures for land acquisition, development and management of Padre Island Park will amount to: first year, \$150,000; second year, \$210,000; third year, \$230,000; fourth year, \$1,500,000; and fifth year, \$250,000.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record the map, map and cross-section of the land, and the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, of Padre Island National Seashore, under the provisions of the bill.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: **THE DIRECTOR**

Attached is a suggested letter to Senator Goldwater whose complimentary remarks concerning the Agency's participation in the U-2 program are also attached.

S/ John S. Warner

**JOHN S. WARNER
Legislative Counsel**

2 JUN 1960

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(17)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

You have not actually dispatched a letter to Senator Goldwater as yet. You did not like the version which John Warner sent over here so you made some changes in it. The attached letter incorporates the changes you desired and has not been signed.

FMC

6 June 1960
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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(47)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	DDCI 	<i>CK</i>	6/11
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3	<i>ER - for destruction</i>		
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <p style="text-align: center;">Also attached is the colloquy between Senators Goldwater and Long (La.) on the floor of the Senate yesterday.</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Legislative Counsel, 			1 June 60
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

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